Vesely v. Armslist by United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
ALEX VESELY, individually and as special  ) 
administrator and brother of JITKA VESELY,  )  
(Deceased),      ) No. 1:13-cv-00607 
       ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
)  
vs.      )  
)  
ARMSLIST, LLC, an Oklahoma Limited  ) 
Liability Company,     )  
Defendants. ) 
 
DEFENDANT ARMSLIST, LLC’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS  
RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 
 
 Defendant Armslist, LLC (“Armslist”) submits this memorandum of law in support of its 
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Armslist for the wrongful death of Jitka Vesely is based on an 
advertisement of a pistol posted on Armslist’s website, www.armslist.com, by a third-party, 
Benedict Ladera, a private seller and resident of Seattle, Washington.  The website serves as an 
electronic bulletin board on which persons can post advertisements for the sale of firearms and 
other outdoor sporting gear. (Doc. 1-1, Compl. at Ex. A; see generally www.armslist.com).  The 
pistol advertised on the website by Ladera was eventually sold by him to Demtry Smirnov, who 
then used the pistol to murder Vesely.   
While Vesely’s senseless murder is a terrible tragedy, there is no legal basis to hold 
Armslist civilly liable for her death.  Plaintiff’s claim, that Armslist is legally responsible for 
Vesely’s death, is barred by federal statute and is not viable under Illinois common law.   Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. §230, protects Armslist from 
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Plaintiff’s claim.  Congress enacted Section 230 to protect operators of interactive computer 
services, like Armslist, from lawsuits seeking to hold them liable for online activity and content 
originated by third-parties and against claims alleging service providers failed to screen or 
exercise editorial control over third-party content.  Section 230 provides an absolute bar to 
Plaintiff’s claims in this case.     
Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to state a cause of action under Illinois common law.   He 
has failed to allege a cognizable legal duty owed by Armslist to protect Vesely from a third-
party’s criminal attack.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations affirmatively establish that Armslist’s 
website was not the legal and proximate cause of Vesely’s death as a matter of law.   
II.  THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff’s Complaint has three counts:  Count I—Wrongful Death Act; Count II—
Survival Action; and Count III—Family Expense Act.1   All three claims arise from the shooting 
death of Vesely in Illinois by Smirnov, a resident of Canada. (Compl. at ¶¶37-41).  Smirnov  
illegally purchased the pistol used in the shooting from Ladera, a private firearm seller and 
resident of Seattle, Washington.  Id. at ¶¶30-32.   Smirnov learned that Ladera was selling the 
pistol when he saw Ladera’s advertisement for the pistol on Armslist’s website, which provides a 
forum for private sellers of outdoor sporting equipment, including firearms, to post “for sale” 
advertisements. See id. at ¶5.   
After contacting Landera, Smirnov purchased the pistol directly from Ladera.  Id. at ¶34 
Smirnov then drove to Chicago and located Vesely, whom he had met online years earlier. As 
Vesely left work and walked to her car on April 13, 2011, Smirnov shot Vesely with the pistol he 
                                                          
1
  These Illinois statutes do not create substantive causes of action.  Rather, each statute creates 
rights in certain family members to collect specified damages resulting from the death of a 
relative.  Claims made for damages under each of these statutes must be based on an 
underlying cause of action (e.g., negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranty). 
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had acquired from Ladera. Id. at ¶¶37-41. “Smirnov immediately turned himself in to police, 
pled guilty, and is currently serving a life sentence without parole.” Id. at ¶1.  Ladera pleaded 
guilty to illegally transferring the pistol to Smirnov and was sentenced to prison. Id. at ¶44. 
Plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the allegations that Armslist’s website “facilitated” 
Smirnov’s purchase of the pistol from Ladera and the website was thus the legal and proximate 
cause of Vesely’s death. (Compl. at ¶¶31, 34 & 51).  Plaintiff alleges that Armslist “design[ed] 
its website to encourage its users to circumvent existing gun laws” which, according to Plaintiff, 
“prohibit private sellers from selling firearms to residents of another state or country, by easily 
enabling prospective purchasers to search for and find gun sellers in any and all states.” (Compl. 
¶50).  As demonstrated below, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under Section 230 of the CDA and 
are not otherwise viable under Illinois common law.
2
  
                                                          
2  Separate and apart from the Complaint’s legal deficiencies, Plaintiff’s allegation that 
Armslist’s website encourages illegal out-of-state firearm sales is based on a 
misunderstanding of federal firearms law.  Although it is illegal under federal law for an 
unlicensed seller to directly transfer a firearm to an unlicensed buyer who resides in another 
state, a seller may lawfully sell a firearm to an out-of-state buyer if the transfer is completed 
through a federally licensed firearms dealer located in the state where the buyer resides.  
Thus, for example, an unlicensed seller in Wisconsin can lawfully sell a firearm to an 
unlicensed buyer in Illinois, provided the firearm is shipped to a federally licensed firearms 
dealer in Illinois who then transfers the firearm to the buyer under the state and federal laws 
applicable to its business, including completion of a federal background check. See 18 U.S.C. 
§922(a)(3) and (a)(5); see also Compl. at ¶18; accord www.atf.gov/firearms/faq/unlicensed-
persons.html (“A person not licensed under the GCA and not prohibited from acquiring 
firearms may purchase a firearm from an out-of-State source and obtain the firearm if an 
arrangement is made with a licensed dealer in the purchaser’s State of residence for the 
purchaser to obtain the firearm from the dealer.”) (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).  Accordingly, 
the fact that Armslist’s website allows users to search for firearms (and other merchandise) 
offered for sale by persons in other states is not encouragement “to circumvent existing gun 
laws” because a firearm sale to a person in another state can be lawful. See 18 U.S.C. 
§922(a)(3) and (a)(5); contra Compl. at ¶50.  As part of the disclaimers posted by Armslist 
and referenced in the Complaint, Armslist informs users to “contact the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives at 1-800-ATF-GUNS or visit the ATF website at 
http://www.atf.gov” if they are “unsure about firearms sales and transfers”. (See Compl. at 
¶45; see Armslist’s “Terms of Use” at www.armslist.com).  
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III.  ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
 A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards.  
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate if plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she is 
plausibly entitled to relief under the facts alleged. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
546 (2007).  The allegations must show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that 
the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008).  In 
considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, the Court should not accept as adequate abstract 
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements. Brooks v. Ross, 
578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).   Whether a complaint is subject to dismissal under 47 U.S.C. 
§230 is appropriately considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 
08-cv-7735-RMB, 2009 WL 1704355, *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009); Nieman v. Versuslaw, 
Inc., 12-3104, 2012 WL 3201935 (C.D. Ill. June 13, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, 
12-cv-3104, 2012 WL 3201931 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009).  Moreover, whether a defendant 
owes a duty to a plaintiff is a question of law that is appropriately decided under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Skyview Film & Video, Inc. v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 864 F. Supp. 755, 757 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 B. Section 230 of the CDA Bars Plaintiff’s Claims.  
 1. The Scope of Section 230. 
Since Congressional enactment of Section 230 in 1996, numerous federal and state courts 
have upheld, enforced and bolstered protection for interactive computer service providers against 
all types of claims, including negligence-based claims against online service providers where 
advertisements for the sale of firearms are posted by third-parties. Cf. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 
08-cv-7735-RMB, 2009 WL 1704355 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009).  Several pertinent parts of the 
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CDA are controlling.  First, Section 230(c)(1) states, in pertinent part: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider. 
 
47 U.S.C. §230 (c)(1).  Section 230 (e)(3) states: 
 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
 
47 U.S.C. §230(e)(3).  Under the CDA, an “interactive computer service” includes any service or 
system that “provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”  47 
U.S.C. §230(f)(2).  An “information content provider” is “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 Thus, “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action 
that could make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.” Chicago Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under The Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 
F. Supp. 2d 681, 688 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff'd sub nom., Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights 
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998)).
3
 
   
                                                          
3  Federal courts throughout the country have reached the same conclusion as Chicago Lawyers' 
(“Section 230 . . . plainly immunizes computer service providers . . . from liability for 
information that originates with third parties”), which confirms that Section 230 protection is 
designed to be broad and robust. See, e.g., Universal Commc'n Sys. Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We too find that Section 230 immunity should be broadly 
construed.”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (the 
“consensus developing across other courts of appeal that Section 230(c) provides broad immunity 
for publishing content provided primarily by third parties”); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 
465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 
984-85 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of, inter alia, negligence claim because Section 230 
“creates a federal immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold computer service 
providers liable for information originating with a third-party”).   
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2. Application of Section 230 to Plaintiff’s Complaint. 
There are three elements to be satisfied to invoke Section 230 protection:  (1) the 
defendant must be a “provider or user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the content was 
“provided by another information content provider” (i.e., the third-party); and (3) the claim 
attempts to treat the defendant as the “publisher or speaker” of the allegedly harmful content. 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Gibson, 2009 WL 1704355, at *3; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 and Ben 
Ezra, Weinstein & Co, 206 F.3d at 984-85.   Here, each of these elements is satisfied; thus, 
Section 230 bars Plaintiff’s claims. 
i. Armslist is a “provider or user of interactive computer services.” 
 
 Under the CDA, “interactive computer services” is broadly defined as “any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).   In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges 
that Armslist operates an “online” internet “website” that allows “users” to “post” and “search” 
advertisements to buy and sell, among other things, firearms from each other.  (Compl. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 
20, 22).   Based on these allegations alone, Armslist is plainly a provider of an interactive 
computer service under Section 230’s definition—that is, Armslist provides an interactive 
website (i.e., the “service” and the “system”) which enables the public (i.e., “multiple users”) to 
access information stored on Armslist’s website, www.armslist.com, by way of the internet (i.e., 
“computer access”).4  
                                                          
4  There can be little dispute that website operators, like Armslist, are “interactive computer service 
providers.” See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers', 461 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (www.craigslist.com is an 
interactive computer service provider), aff'd, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 
1123-24 (www.matchmaker.com is an interactive computer service provider); Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 05-cv-926-AA, 2005 WL 3005602, at *1 (D.Or. Nov. 8, 2005) (“Yahoo! is an interactive 
computer service provider . . . . Any person with access to the Internet may, at no charge, register 
as a Yahoo! user, obtain an online Yahoo! identifier and account, and then engage in various 
online activities . . . .”). 
Case: 1:13-cv-00607 Document #: 14 Filed: 02/22/13 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:68
7 
 
ii. The pistol advertisement was “provided by another 
information content provider.” 
 
 Under the CDA, an “information content provider” is a person or entity responsible, in 
whole or in part, for creating or developing information provided through the internet or anther 
interactive computer service.  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  Plaintiff’s Complaint makes clear that the 
pistol advertisement was posted to www.armslist.com by Landera:   
In January 2011, Benedict Ladera, who had previously sold over 20 
firearms on armslist.com, purchased a handgun from his landlord’s 
cousin, confident that he could turn around and sell it for profit on 
armslist.com.  Landera, a resident of Seattle, quickly found a buyer 
for the gun – Demetry Smirnov.  Upon information and belief, 
Smirnov found the handgun using armslist.com’s “Power Search” 
function, and through armslist.com contacted Ladera. 
 
(Compl. at ¶¶29-30).   Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint specifically states that the “seller creates a 
‘post’ for the firearm it is selling[.]” (Compl. at ¶22; see also ¶24 (“Armslist requires users to 
advertise”).  Ladera is clearly not Armslist; nor does Plaintiff allege that Armslist created or 
placed the advertisement for Ladera’s pistol.  Ladera posted the pistol advertisement, and 
therefore under the plain language of the CDA, Ladera is “another information content 
provider”—i.e., a third-party.    
iii. Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to hold Armslist responsible for 
the advertisement as the “publisher or speaker.”  
 
 Plaintiff attempts to plead around the “publisher or speaker” requirement by alleging that 
Armslist “matches buyers and sellers solely based on Armslist’s mandatory drop-down menus 
that steer illegal buyers to illegal sellers.  Armslist’s development of content thus materially 
contributes to the illegality of the gun sales it promotes.” (Compl. at ¶27).   Plaintiff also alleges 
that Armslist “has demonstrated that it possess the capability to filter content on its website when 
it chooses to do so.” Id. at ¶28.    
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First, these activities—matching users, monitoring, regulating, maintaining and 
developing content—are traditional editorial functions of a publisher for which an interactive 
computer service provider cannot be liable. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“lawsuits seeking to hold a 
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred”).  As aptly stated 
by one federal court: 
Because it has the right to exercise editorial control over those with 
whom it contracts and whose words it disseminates, it would seem 
only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher 
or, at least, like a book store owner or library, to the liability 
standards applied to a distributor.
 
 But Congress has made a different 
policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive 
service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making 
available content prepared by others. 
 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasis added).  Consequently, 
Plaintiff’s Complaint, on its face, improperly treats Armslist as the publisher or speaker of 
Ladera’s pistol advertisement. See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 41 (Wash. App. 
Ct. 2001) (applying CDA and barring claims against Amazon.com for alleged exercise of 
editorial discretion and decision-making authority over postings on its website).  
 Second, even “artful” pleading cannot side-step Section 230 protection. Doe v. MySpace, 
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“No matter how artfully Plaintiffs seek to 
plead their claims, the Court views Plaintiffs’ claims as directed toward [defendant] in its 
publishing, editorial, and/or screening capacities.”), aff'd, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).  Even 
with Plaintiff’s mischaracterization of Armslist as a facilitator of “illegal gun sales” with the 
“capability to filter content” cannot change the application or outcome under Section 230.  At 
bottom, Plaintiff’s Complaint still treats Armslist as the publisher of third-party content 
regardless of the alleged commercial nature of Armslist’s services. See Corbis Corp. v. 
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Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding Section 230 barred state 
law claims against Amazon.com for third parties’ advertisement and sale of allegedly unlawful 
items on Amazon.com’s third-party selling service); Stoner v. eBay Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 
1705637, *1 (Cal. Super, Ct. Nov. 1, 2000) (Section 230 protected eBay from liability stemming 
from the sale of material by third-party users of its internet services).
5
 
 The plaintiff’s allegations in Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 08-cv-7735-RMB, 2009 WL 
1704355 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009), were nearly identical to the allegations in this case.  In 
Gibson, the plaintiff, the victim of a shooting where the assailant had acquired a firearm through 
a Craigslist advertisement, sought “to hold [Craigslist] liable for its alleged failure to block, 
screen, or otherwise prevent the dissemination of a third party's content, i.e., the gun 
advertisement in question[.]” Id. at. *4.   Plaintiff further alleged that Craigslist “failed to 
monitor, regulate, properly maintain and police the merchandise being bought and sold on its . . . 
website” and “is either unable or unwilling to allocate the necessary resources to monitor, police, 
maintain and properly supervise the goods and services sold on its . . . website.”  Id. at *4.   The 
Court strongly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that, under the circumstances, he was not a trying 
to impose liability on Craigslist as a “publisher of third-party content[.]” Id. at *4.   In sum, 
Craigslist was entitled to immunity under Section 230, and the plaintiff’s complaint was 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  
 Courts in this district have reached similar decisions.  In Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. 
Supp. 2d. 961, 967-68 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Grady, J.), the Northern District of Illinois held that “[a] 
                                                          
5
  Furthermore, holding Armslist liable for third-party content would inevitably treat Armslist 
as a publisher because it would (1) put Armslist in the posture of the original poster (here, 
Ladera) who is the actual “publisher,” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; and (2) mandate Armslist to 
conduct the very “quintessential” publishing functions, e.g., reviewing, editing, monitoring 
and screening of third-party content, that Section 230 is designed to eliminate the need for in 
the first place. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.   
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claim against an online service provider for negligently publishing harmful information created 
by its users treats the defendant as the ‘publisher’ of that information.” Id. In dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that “Craigslist causes or induces its 
users to post unlawful ads-by having an ‘adult services’ category with subsections like ‘w4m’ 
and by permitting its users to search through the ads ‘based on their preferences.’” Id. at 968.  As 
stated by the court,  
[w]hile we accept as true for the purposes of this motion plaintiff’s 
allegation that users routinely flout Craigslist's guidelines, it is not 
because Craigslist has caused them to do so. Or if it has, it is only “in 
the sense that no one could post [unlawful content] if craigslist did not 
offer a forum.” Chicago Lawyers', 519 F.3d at 671. Section 230(c)(1) 
would serve little if any purpose if companies like  Craigslist were 
found liable under state law for “causing” or “inducing” users to post 
unlawful content in this fashion. (citation omitted). The fact that 
Craigslist also provides a wordsearch function does not change the 
analysis.  The word-search function is a “neutral tool” that permits 
users to search for terms that they select in ads created by other users. 
Dart, 665 F.Supp.2d at 969.    
The allegation in Dart that Craigslist was “[f]acilitating” and “assisting” in illegal activity 
was held by to be within the immunity provided by the CDA.  Id. at 967.   The court emphasized  
that “[i]ntermediaries are not culpable for ‘aiding and abetting’ their customers who misuse their 
services to commit unlawful acts.” Id. (citation omitted). See also Chicago Lawyers', 519 F.3d at 
672 (under § 230(c)(1) a plaintiff “cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a 
third party’s plan to engage in unlawful [activity].”). 
 As in Gibson and Dart, Plaintiff’s claim against Armslist is based on the manner in which 
Armslist exercises its function and discretion in its publishing, editorial, and/or screening 
capacities.  Under the CDA, Armslist cannot be liable for the advertisement published on its 
website by Ladera, the manner in which Smirnov used the website or the illegal activity that 
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transpired between Landera and Smirnov.  Armslist is protected from liability to the Plaintiff, 
and the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
 C. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Viable Claim Under Illinois Law. 
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the CDA does not bar Plaintiff’s action, Plaintiff’s 
Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a viable claim under Illinois law.  Illinois 
substantive law applies to this case because federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship.  Reynolds v. CB Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Casio, 
Inc. v. S.M. & R. Co., 755 F.2d 528, 531 (7th Cir.1985).   To properly plead a cause of action, 
“the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of care, that the defendant breached 
that duty, and that the plaintiff incurred injuries proximately caused by the breach.” Johnson v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2009); Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill.2d 433, 
444, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004).  As explained below, Plaintiff has not and cannot allege 
that Armslist owed Vesely a recognized duty under Illinois law.  Even assuming a cognizable 
duty exists, Plaintiff’s allegations affirmatively establish that Armslist was not the legal and 
proximate cause of Vesely’s death.   
1. Plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable duty under Illinois law. 
 
A claim must be dismissed in the absence of a duty owed by the defendant. Young, 213 
Ill.2d at 444; see also Linton v. Smith & Wesson, a Div. of Bangor Punta Corp., 127 Ill. App. 3d 
676, 469 N.E.2d 339 (1st Dist. 1984) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
firearm manufacturer owed no duty to prevent sale of its pistols to persons likely to cause harm 
to the public).     
Here, Plaintiff asserts that “[a]t all relevant times Armslist owed a duty to the public, 
including Jitka, to operate its website, armslist.com, in a commercially reasonable manner.” 
Case: 1:13-cv-00607 Document #: 14 Filed: 02/22/13 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:73
12 
 
(Compl. at ¶49).   This so-called duty to “operate” a website in a “commercially reasonable 
manner” is not a cognizable duty under Illinois tort law and Plaintiff’s claim therefore fails as a 
matter of law.  However, assuming that Plaintiff means to claim that Armslist owed Vesely a 
duty under Illinois negligence law, his claim still fails.  
Under Illinois negligence law, a duty to protect someone from criminal acts by third-
parties may exist only where the parties stand in one of four “special relationships,” namely: “(1) 
common carrier and passenger, (2) innkeeper and guest, (3) business invitor and invitee, and (4) 
voluntary custodian and protectee.” Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524, 641 
N.E. 2d 886, 890 (1st Dist. 1994) (citing Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 (Ill. 
1975) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §314(a) (1965)); and Rowe v. State Bank of 
Lombard, 125 Ill.2d 203, 215-216 (Ill.1988)).   These relationships can involve situations in 
which the party owning the duty had the ability or right to “control” the person causing the harm.  
Cf. Geimer v. Chicago Park Dist., 272 Ill. App. 3d 629, 650 N.E.2d 585 (1st Dist. 1995) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant park district owed plaintiff a duty to prevent 
intentional harmful conduct inflicted by fellow football participant).  At bottom, Plaintiff has not 
alleged that Armslist and Vesely stood in one of the recognized “special relationships” from 
which a duty may arise to protect another against criminal acts by third parties; nor did Armslist 
have any “control” over Vesely’s assailant, Smirnov. Thus, Plaintiffs Complaint should be 
dismissed.  
2. Plaintiff’s allegations affirmatively establish that Armslist did not 
proximately cause Vesely’s death.    
  
In addition to pleading a cognizable duty under Illinois law, Plaintiff must plead facts 
showing that Armslist’s conduct was a proximate cause of Vesely’s death.  Estate of Johnson by 
Johnson v. Condell Mem'l Hosp., 119 Ill.2d 496, 503, 520 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ill. 1988).  While 
Case: 1:13-cv-00607 Document #: 14 Filed: 02/22/13 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:74
13 
 
proximate cause is generally a question of fact, the lack of proximate cause may be determined 
by the court as a matter of law where the facts alleged do not sufficiently demonstrate 
defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the harm claimed. Young, 213 Ill.2d at 447 
(citation omitted); Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for lack of proximate cause).   
The term “proximate cause” encompasses two distinct elements: cause in fact and legal 
cause.  Young, 213 Ill.2d at 446-447.   Cause in fact exists where there is reasonable certainty 
that a defendant’s acts or omissions caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Lee v. Chicago Transit 
Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455, 605 N.E.2d 493, 502 (Ill. 1992).  Cause in fact requires an 
analysis of the nexus (if any) between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury:  the defendant’s 
actions must be a material element and substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 455.  
Importantly, “liability cannot be premised merely upon surmise or conjecture as to the cause of 
the injury.” Id.  Here, nothing in the service offered by Armslist induces users to post 
advertisements for unlawful firearms sales or to complete an unlawful firearms sale, and, most 
fundamentally, it does not induce persons to commit murder.  Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil 
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., illustrates the point:  
Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any 
particular listing or express a preference for discrimination; for example, 
craigslist does not offer a lower price to people who include 
discriminatory statements in their postings. If craigslist “causes” the 
discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier services 
(and, for that matter, the firms that make the computers and software that 
owners use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that 
Microsoft and Dell are liable for “causing” discriminatory advertisements. 
 
519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008). 
The legal cause requirement is met only if the defendant’s conduct is “so closely tied to 
the plaintiff’s injury that he should be held legally responsible for it.”  Simmons v. Garces, 198 
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Ill. 2d 541, 558, 763 N.E.2d 720, 732 (Ill. 2002).    Illinois law differentiates a mere condition 
conducive to injury from the legal cause of an injury.  Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 
251, 259, 811 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Ill. 2004).  “Where a negligent act or omission does nothing 
more than furnish a condition which makes an injury possible, but the injury is caused by the 
subsequent independent act of a third person, the two acts are not concurrent and the condition is 
not the proximate cause of the injury.”  Sokolowski v. All Points Distrib. Serv., Inc., 243 Ill.App. 
3d 539, 542-43, 612 N.E.2d 79, 82 (1st Dist. 1993).  Illinois law is clear that if the act of a third-
party is the immediate cause of the injury, and, the third-party is not under the “control” of the 
one guilty of the alleged original wrong, the connection is broken and the first alleged act or 
omission is not the proximate cause of the injury.  City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 
Ill.2d 351, 406, 408, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1134 (Ill. 2004). Consequently, a defendant’s conduct 
cannot be the legal cause of an injury where an intervening criminal act of a third-party breaks 
the causal connection.  Id. at 408.  
As a matter of law, Plaintiff’s allegations affirmatively establish that Armslist did not 
proximately cause Vesely’s death.  Arsmlist’s website was merely a forum where Smirnov was 
able to view an advertisement posted by Ladera offering to sell a lawful product. Indeed, 
Plaintiff affirmatively pleads at least three intervening criminal acts, each of which breaks any 
causal connection between the website and Vesely’s death: (1) Smirnov’s intentional homicidal 
act, (2) Smirnov’s illegal purchase of the pistol from Ladera, and (3) Ladera’s illegal sale of the 
pistol to Smirnov.  Nor is there any allegation that Smirnov was under Armslist’s “control” at the 
time of the murder.  To the contrary, Smirnov’s homicidal act was the result of his own volition.  
Under these allegations and as a matter of law, Armslist did not proximately cause Vesely’s 
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tragic death. See City of Chicago, 213 Ill.2d at 408.
6
 
CONCLUSION 
 For each of the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that Plaintiff’s 
Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.   
DATED:  February 22, 2013 
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6
  Numerous Illinois courts have refused to recognize a duty on firearm sellers for the tortious 
and criminal acts of firearms users.  And those courts have consistently held that firearm 
sales were not the proximate cause of such shootings.  See, e.g., Riordan v. International 
Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642 (1985) (manufacturers and distributors of firearms used 
in fatal shootings were not liable for wrongful deaths of victims because they owed no duty 
to the victims of crimes committed by third-parties); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 
Ill.App.3d 676 (1st Dist. 1984) (firearm manufacturer owed no duty to plaintiff who was shot 
by third-party); Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331 (1914) (store’s sale of rifle 
and ammo to minor, while illegal, was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury because 
the store’s negligence merely furnished a condition which made the injury possible); Martin 
v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.1984) (recognizing that every 
Illinois court considering the issue has determined that the criminal misuse of firearms is not 
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer).  Because manufacturers and distributors have no 
duty to shooting victims and cannot be the proximate cause of such shootings carried out by 
third-parties, certainly a website providing a forum for persons to advertise, among other 
things, their sale of firearms cannot a owe a duty to victims of criminal firearm violence; nor 
can a website be the proximate cause of injuries caused by intentional criminal acts of others. 
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